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abstract.  A federal official’s physical proximity to Washington often provides a rough ap-
proximation of his political authority. In this respect, our controversial and much-criticized system 
of federal criminal law is distinct. Within this domain, thousands of immensely empowered offi-
cials exercise enormous control despite being scattered across the country. Legal scholarship has 
generated volumes of criticisms of this system, with less attention devoted to how and why it de-
veloped in this manner and what might be said in its favor. 
 This Note offers a novel explanation and defense of the decentralized nature of the federal 
administration of justice. To do so, it first excavates the historical and contemporary dynamics 
surrounding the Department of Justice, demonstrating that this structure is a feature of congres-
sional design rather than a bug of congressional abdication. While Presidents since the Founding 
have called for the centralization of criminal law enforcement, Congress has generally ignored or 
rebuffed those demands, instead choosing to disperse prosecutorial power in the hands of thou-
sands of lower-level executive-branch officials. The story of federal criminal law therefore reveals 
that the rivalry between the branches persists in certain domains and that Congress can pursue its 
objectives by structuring relationships within the executive branch itself. 
 This Note argues that the significant authority delegated to individual federal prosecutors vis-
à-vis Main Justice and the President has two undertheorized benefits. Decentralization places a 
practical check on presidential power in an area bereft of formal constraints. It also enables the 
creation of relationships between federal and state and local law enforcement officials, facilitating 
the incorporation of local enforcement priorities in a policy area that has always been considered 
of uniquely local interest. While defending the general contours of the federal administration of 
justice, this Note aims also to propose more realistic and productive reforms to the federal prose-
cutorial system that are responsive to the separation-of-powers dynamics at play. 
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introduction 
Once an almost trivial aspect of the federal government’s role, federal crimi-
nal prosecution has now taken center stage, serving as the subject of constant 
controversy.
1
 It should come as no surprise that questions regarding the direc-
tion of federal criminal law have grown.
2
 There have never been more federal 
criminal laws on the books
3
 or more prosecutors enforcing those statutes.
4
 Times 
of potential transition present unique opportunities for taking stock. Given that 
the role of federal prosecutors within the American political system continues to 
grow more contentious, it is more important than ever to understand the legal 




1. See, e.g., Michael Kruse, Trump’s Long War with Justice, POLITICO (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www
.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/23/donald-trump-jeff-sessions-justice-department 
-war-219592 [https://perma.cc/ASQ5-VTTJ]; Kevin Liptak & Clare Foran, Trump Says Jeff 
Sessions ‘Never Took Control of the Justice Department,’ CNN (Aug. 23, 2018, 6:45 AM ET), 
http://www.cnn.com/2018/08/23/politics/trump-jeff-sessions-justice-department [https://
perma.cc/435D-AUX7]; Philip Rucker & Matt Zapotosky, Trump Breaches Boundaries by Say-
ing DOJ Should Be ‘Going After’ Democrats, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2017), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-breaches-boundaries-by-saying-doj-should-be 
-going-after-democrats/2017/11/03/1c157c08-c0aa-11e7-97d9-bdab5a0ab381_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/FUC9-ZENV]; Benjamin Wittes, ‘The Saddest Thing’: President Trump 
Acknowledges Constraint, LAWFARE (Nov. 3, 2017, 1:02 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/saddest-thing-president-trump-acknowledges-constraint [https://perma.cc/L7Q3-5EC4]. 
2. See Sadie Gurman, Rod Rosenstein Sees Crime-Fighting as Justice’s Overlooked Strong Suit, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2018, 5:46 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rod-rosenstein-sees-crime
-fighting-as-justices-overlooked-strong-suit-1539985607 [https://perma.cc/9TH4-3VSG]. 
3. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text. 
4. See U.S. Att’y’s Office E. Dist. La., Largest Increase in AUSAs in Decades Allocates Prosecutors to 
Focus on Violent Crime, Civil Enforcement, and Immigration Crimes, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 4, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edla/pr/largest-increase-ausas-decades-allocates 
-prosecutors-focus-violent-crime-civil [https://perma.cc/9F4E-7CRS]. The number of per-
sonnel employed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices has risen substantially over time. Compare ROB-
ERT F. BAIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS STATISTICAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 1960, at 5, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2009/07/31
/STATISTICAL_REPORT_FISCAL_YEAR_1960.pdf [https://perma.cc/53ML-U4DZ] 
(noting that “an average of 1613 employees were employed in United States Attorneys’ offices” 
in 1960); with EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 2, https://www.justice.gov/sites
/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/09/01/10statrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6JV-4TGX] (not-
ing that “6,075 full time equivalent (FTE) attorneys and 5,799 FTE support employees” were 
employed in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in 2010).  
5. J. Richard Broughton, Congressional Inquiry and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 
457, 458 (2012). 
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Despite the staggering expansion of federal criminal law over the last half 
century,
6
 authority within federal law enforcement has remained remarkably 
dispersed. Since the Founding, federal prosecutors, armed with extraordinarily 
broad statutory authority, have been scattered throughout the country.
7
 While 
formally operating within the executive-branch chain of command, these prose-
cutors today work in almost one hundred U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs), each 
led by a presidential appointee with his or her own local power base.
8
 
The dispersed nature of our system of federal law enforcement comes as a 
surprise given that the rest of our administrative apparatus has undergone far 
more dramatic centralization.
9
 This structural anomaly remains of great practical 
import. As James Q. Wilson reminds us, “Organization matters . . . . The key 
difference between more and less successful bureaucracies . . . has less to do with 
finances, client populations, or legal arrangements than with organizational sys-
tems.”
10
 In 2017, U.S. Attorneys, operating with a great deal of autonomy, pur-
sued pending cases against more than 100,000 criminal defendants.
11
 These 
low-visibility prosecutorial decisions collectively form much of our public policy 
surrounding criminal law and enforcement.
12
 
Rather than trying to explain how we got here, however, legal scholarship 
“takes the modern prosecutor’s office as a given, a dragon that we find living in 
 
6. The “federalization” of crime has been well documented. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing 
Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 
41-44 (1996) (documenting the growth of federal criminal statutes); Rory K. Little, Myths 
and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1029-70 (1995) (reviewing the litera-
ture on the federalization debate); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Re-
venge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 610-
11 (2005) (discussing the growth of federal criminal legislation). 
7. See infra Section I.A. 
8. Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 369, 371-72 (2009). 
9. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (arguing 
that the executive branch became significantly more centralized under Presidents Reagan, 
Bush, and Clinton). Courts have also condoned this centralization. See David J. Barron & 
Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. L. REV. 201, 241-45; see also infra 
Section I.C (comparing the Department of Justice with other agencies). 
10. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 
23 (1989). 
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2017, at 4, http://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1081801/download [https://perma
.cc/6886-VD6E]. 
12. See JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL 
AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 18 (1978). 
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our midst and wish to tame.”
13
 As this language indicates, many consider the 
concentration of power in the hands of prosecutors—from the federal to the lo-
cal—to be the “overriding evil” of American criminal justice.
14
 Some have gone 
so far as to label federal criminal law specifically the domain of “prosecutorial ad-
ministration,” the consequences of which “should concern anyone interested in 
a rational criminal justice regime.”
15
 Given the large body of criticism, the lack 
of attention to the forces behind the dispersed nature of federal law enforcement 
seems glaring. 
This Note draws on history and contemporary practice to offer a novel ex-
planation and defense of the current decentralized structure of federal law en-
forcement. Many scholars frame proposals for limiting prosecutorial power as 
ways to compensate for congressional “abdication.”
16
 This Note reveals, how-
ever, that the structure of federal criminal law is the result not of abdication but 
rather of confrontation: a centuries-long tug-of-war between Congress and the 
Executive for control over the Justice Department. Since the Founding, members 
 
13. David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 473, 474 (2016). 
14. Donald A. Dripps, Reinventing Plea Bargaining, in THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW: WORKING 
PAPERS FROM THE 2014 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE ROBINA INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL LAW 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55, 66 (Michelle Madden Dempsey et al. eds., 2014); see also James 
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1552 (1981) (“If we 
are truly concerned about compassion, we are less likely to achieve it through the hidden and 
unpredictable use of prosecutorial discretion than through encouraging the legislature to see 
and respond to the results of archaic or overly harsh laws.”). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, 
Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271 
(2013) [hereinafter Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration] (arguing that the current power af-
forded to federal prosecutors threatens the legitimacy of the American criminal system); Ra-
chel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) (ar-
guing for strict enforcement of separation of powers in the criminal law context). 
15. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 14, at 274. 
16. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Dis-
cretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 757 (1999) [hereinafter Richman, Federal Criminal Law] (criti-
cizing the fact that “[m]uch of the literature on federal criminal law bemoans the extent to 
which Congress has abdicated its legislative responsibilities and left enforcement decisions to 
prosecutorial discretion”); see also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and 
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 795 (2003) [hereinafter Richman, Prosecutors and 
Their Agents] (noting that “the federal criminal ‘code’ may well be even broader than that of 
the states in the range of conduct it ostensibly covers”); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 
629 (observing that the statutory scheme of federal crimes “amounts to an invitation to fed-
eral agents and prosecutors to look on federal crimes and sentences not as laws that define 
criminal conduct and its consequences but as a menu that defines prosecutors’ options”); Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 545 (2001) 
(noting that “Congress is likely to give great weight to the demands of federal prosecutors, 
even though those demands may not advance goals the public cares about”). 
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of Congress have battled with the President over the proper allocation of prose-
cutorial autonomy within the executive branch, regardless of whether they were 
aligned with the President’s political party or not.
17
 In more recent years, even 
as the executive branch has more successfully centralized some control, Congress 
has continued to encourage and promote the autonomy of U.S. Attorneys scat-
tered across the country, in some cases to a remarkable extent.
18
 
In doing so, this Note enters into the debate regarding the contemporary 
accuracy of the Madisonian vision of separation of powers. Our tripartite scheme 
of government assumes that “the great security against a gradual concentration 
of several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who ad-
minister each department the necessary constitutional means and personal mo-
tives to resist encroachments of the others.”
19
 Yet many have questioned the ve-
racity of this motivating premise behind the separation of powers in American 
political life.
20
 Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have offered the most promi-
nent eulogy for the Madisonian vision. In their view, members of Congress do 
not maintain loyalty to Congress qua Congress, but rather maintain loyalty to 
party and, along with it, party members in competing branches.
21
  
Rather than conceding the demise of the interbranch rivalry so crucial to the 
functioning of the separation of powers, this Note argues that with respect to 
federal criminal justice, the rivalry endures. It also provides evidence that the 
Founders crafted a system in which Congress “stood the first among equals” pre-
cisely because it retained the power to structure the other branches.
22
 In other 
words, this Note identifies both the weapon (dispersion) and the target (crimi-
nal law) of congressional resistance in the interbranch conflict. If we want to 
 
17. See infra Part I. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
20. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312, 2316-29 (2006); see also Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The 
Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1809 n.222 (2007) (agreeing with the assertions 
of Levinson and Pildes); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2013) (“If Congress is not as 
reliable a check on presidential power as Madison and others envisioned, there is arguably a 
greater need for other mechanisms of constraint in this area, including legal constraints. In 
the absence of judicial review, however, it is fair to ask how the legal constraints might oper-
ate.”); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
530-40 (2015) (discussing the evolution of the balance of power from a system of branches to 
an internal administrative separation of powers). 
21. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 20, at 2319. 
22. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 110-11 (2005). 
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revive the rivalry in other areas, we’ll need to identify the reasons why this dy-
namic endures in this domain but not others. Only in desegregating these con-
texts can we envision a new scheme of separation of powers that takes into ac-
count both party and institutional loyalties. 
This history also offers a cautionary tale for those eager to centralize the ad-
ministrative apparatus surrounding federal criminal law. Scholars and pundits, 
for example, have called for the transfer of authority over criminal-enforcement 
priorities to the White House and Main Justice specifically.
23
 This push can be 
situated within a larger current of advocacy for increased presidential control 
over enforcement priorities—both criminal and civil—across the administrative 
state.
24
 Indeed, the modern trend has been a migration toward the centralization 
of the executive bureaucratic apparatus.
25 
Many scholars and commentators have 
celebrated this movement.
26 
But the dispersed nature of the federal administration of justice is long over-
due for a defense.
27
 The history of federal criminal prosecution speaks to the 
underexplored benefits of an enforcement structure that lodges discretionary au-
thority within actors at the periphery instead of those at the center. This Note 
suggests that the benefits of federal dispersion in this area are twofold. First, this 
structure allows multiple actors to exercise authority over criminal enforcement, 
 
23. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-214 
(1969) (calling for the government to make prosecutorial decision-making more centralized); 
Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference to the Department of 
Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387, 459 (2017) (arguing 
for an independent commission to advise the President on criminal-enforcement policy); Dan 
M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 506-21 (1996) 
(arguing for the imposition of uniform interpretations of criminal statutes by Main Justice to 
be followed by all field offices). 
24. See generally Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013) 
(detailing the President’s use of the enforcement power to advance his objectives in civil con-
texts); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104 (2015) (defending the President’s ability to institutionalize his enforcement pri-
orities in the immigration law context); Kagan, supra note 9 (explaining and defending the 
rise of presidential control of the bureaucracy); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to 
Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015) (arguing that the Constitution imposes a duty on the Ex-
ecutive to supervise and centralize enforcement power). 
25. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 24, at 135-42; Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Con-
trol, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688-706 (2016) (documenting the “entrenchment of presidential 
control” over the bureaucracy); see also Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unortho-
dox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1845 (2015) (“It is the White House, often through 
OIRA, that now may direct the rulemaking process, instead of the agency . . . .”). 
26. Kagan, supra note 9, at 2332; see also sources cited supra note 23. 
27. For a notable exception in the context of sentencing reform, see Kate Stith, The Arc of the 
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1449 (2008). 
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diffusing power within the executive branch itself. Second, the dispersed struc-
ture of the federal criminal apparatus facilitates the creation of relationships be-
tween federal enforcement actors and their state and local counterparts, allowing 
for local participation—and accompanying variance—in federal policy making. 
In other words, the system promotes the values of federalism, transforming state 
and local actors from their oft-depicted role as “servants” to that of “partners” 
with their federal counterparts.
28
  
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I sketches the history of the enforce-
ment of federal criminal law, which has always been defined by its decentralized 
nature. At the Founding, federal attorneys were spread throughout the country, 
subject to no statutorily defined chain of command within the executive branch, 
and they often lacked efficient means of communication with national officials.
29
 
Despite calls for placing the apparatus more firmly under presidential control, 
Congress maintained a decentralized criminal law regime where power was ex-
ercised on the periphery. Some scholars have examined this history to ascertain 
the constitutional boundaries of executive control of law enforcement.
30
 This 
Note does not argue that this history conclusively settles the contours of execu-
tive power; instead, it relies on this history to show how Congress can, in prac-
tice, check presidential ambitions. 
Turning to the present era, Part II examines the other side of the power 
struggle: executive-branch tools employed in the service of monitoring and cen-
tralizing law enforcement control. Part II reveals that these mechanisms by 
which the center could theoretically exert more authority over the periphery have 
achieved some successes but are often quite ineffective in practice, in part because 
of congressional opposition to centralization efforts. Yet clashes between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches over policy decisions in this domain have served 
a valuable purpose in their own right—bringing to the forefront enforcement 
choices often shielded from public view. 
This exploration of modern practice also reveals the benefits of our decen-
tralized system, a point elaborated in Part III, which defends the decentralized 
 
28. Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633, 2635 (2006) (“Unlike the 
sovereign, the servant lacks autonomy and, if push comes to shove, must cede to the higher 
authority. The power of the servant thus stems mainly from dependence . . . .”); Greg Brooker, 
U.S. Att’y for the Dist. of Minn., Remarks at the Department of Justice’s Human Trafficking 
Summit (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/us-attorney-district-minnesota 
-greg-brooker-delivers-remarks-department-justice-s-human [https://perma.cc/FJH4 
-NBNJ] (speaking of the “strong partnerships . . . with local law enforcement partners”).  
29. Beale, supra note 8, at 394; Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our 
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 567-68. 
30. See sources cited infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
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structure of federal criminal law as both a method of facilitating local participa-
tion and as a check on presidential power. In other words, the maintenance of 
the interbranch rivalry presents not merely an end itself, but a means to a more 
desirable constitutional end.
31
 Commentators often associate state and local gov-
ernments with the benefits of federalism, such as innovation and responsive-
ness.
32
 But our federal criminal apparatus reveals that nationalization and cen-
tralization in Washington, D.C., are not one and the same. It is possible for the 
federal government to structure itself to be responsive to local conditions and 
preferences—but it will necessitate a more public debate over which policy posi-
tions should be truly national and which should allow for variation. 
i .  from disarray to a department of justice 
This Part draws on historical research to trace the development of our federal 
criminal apparatus from an almost insignificant, to a now nearly critical, aspect 
of the federal government’s role. Along the way, it reveals not only the existence 
of a rivalry between the executive and legislative branches in this domain, but 
also how that rivalry contributed to federal criminal law’s past and present struc-
ture. 
A. Dispersion: Federal Criminal Law at the Founding 
Our Department of Justice (DOJ) emerged from modest beginnings. The 
Department did not exist until after the Civil War and has been almost com-
pletely decentralized for most of its history. A tour of early federal criminal law 
enforcement reveals a battle between the executive branch and Congress over the 
proper allocation of prosecutorial authority. Congress largely resisted executive 
demands to centralize the apparatus, until it began to fear that the apparatus was 
 
31. See David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2018) (making this case in the context of discussing institutional loyalties). 
32. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 343 (1990) (“Bu-
reaucrats in Washington simply cannot gather and process the vast amount of information 
needed to tailor regulations to the nation’s many variations in circumstances and the constant 
changes in relevant conditions. In order to reduce decision making costs, national officials 
adopt uniform regulations that are inevitably procrustean in application.”). For a critique of 
this position, see Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 65-70 
(2016). See also Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare for?, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1695 (2018) (debunking this common presumption in arguing that “pol-
icy variation and experimentation—two oft-referenced federalism attributes—were generated 
as much in the various nationally run insurance exchanges as in the state-run exchanges”). 
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falling out of its control—causing legislators to rethink the balance of power be-
tween the center and the periphery. 
Unitary executivists and pluralists alike have combed the pages of history to 
discern the permissible contours of presidential control of criminal law.
33
 Yet this 
battle of competing archival documents might have considered the wrong ques-
tion all along. The early history may not conclusively reveal the formal bounda-
ries of executive power vis-à-vis the other branches, but it surely provides an-
swers as to how and why the rivalry between the branches plays out in practice. 
As noted above, Madison predicted in selling the new structure of the federal 
government to the public that the “partition of power” would be maintained by 
“the interior structure of the government” because “its several constituent parts 
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their 
proper places.”
34
 This history reveals how, at least in the context of criminal law, 
the branches can keep one another in place, even as we continue to struggle to 
define what their proper places might be. 
The Constitution’s text remains relatively circumspect regarding the con-
tours of a potential system of federal criminal law enforcement. The Constitu-
tion vests the power to execute the law in the President and gives him the au-
thority—some say the obligation—to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”
35
 The Constitution also grants the pardon power to the President.
36
 
Taking these strands of constitutional authority together, it would seem that be-
cause prosecution is a vital means of executing the law, the executive power in-
cludes the right to control prosecutions.
37
 Others counter that these constitu-
tional clauses indicate precisely the opposite. The pardon power exists because 
the President cannot control prosecutions, and the Take Care Clause (read in con-
 
33. Compare Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005) (arguing 
that the history of federal criminal law enforcement and the text, history, and structure of the 
Constitution reveal that the President is the prosecutor in chief), with Bloch, supra note 29, at 
563-618 (suggesting that the history is more mixed and the Founders likely did not intend to 
reproduce the English system, in which the king exercised expansive control over prosecuto-
rial functions), and William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the 
Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 484-502 (1989) (arguing that the Founding gen-
eration was divided over whether prosecution was exclusively an executive function). 
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 19, at 320.  
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“[E]xecutive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”); id. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”). 
36. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (granting the President “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences 
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment”). 
37. See Prakash, supra note 33, at 551-52. 
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junction with Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause) re-
quires the President to enforce whatever system Congress creates—including 
one that delegates prosecutorial discretion to a different official.
38
 
In practice, Congress made the first move. Our national criminal apparatus 
has statutory roots. The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the position of District  
Attorney (now U.S. Attorney), who was to be a person “learned in the law” and 
whose duty it would be to “prosecute in [a] district all delinquents for crimes 
and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States.”
39
 The Attor-
ney General was to “prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in 
which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion 
upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or 
when requested by the heads of any of the departments.”
40
 In other words, the 
Act cabined the Attorney General’s role to that of litigator in the Supreme Court 
and counselor to the President and the District Attorneys. 
The modesty of the Attorney General position in the early republic cannot 
be overstated. The first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, renowned for his 
good looks and legal acumen,
41
 found himself in a relatively undignified position 
bereft of any binding legal authority. Congress paid the Attorney General less 
than half the salary of the Secretary of the Treasury.
42
 When Randolph sought 
authority to direct the District Attorneys, Congress rejected his request.
43
 He 




In the ensuing years, Congress took dispersion to a degree unthinkable in 
the modern era: it frequently delegated criminal law enforcement responsibility 
to individuals who were in no way subject to executive command, namely private 
 
38. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from His-
tory, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 282 n.32 (1989); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President 
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21, 69 (1994). 
39. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93. 
40. Id. 
41. See HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF 
JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 18-19 (1937). 
42. Compare Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 18, § 1, 1 Stat. 72, 72 (setting compensation for the judiciary 
and the Attorney General), with Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 67, 67 (setting the 
executive salaries). 
43. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 26, 1791), in 1 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: MISCELLANEOUS 46, 46 (Walter Lowrie &Walter S> Franklin eds., Washington, D.C., 
Gales & Seaton 1834). 
44. Bloch, supra note 29, at 571. 
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citizens and state officials. At the Founding, Congress allowed state officials to 
prosecute violations of federal law in state courts.
45
 Private citizens could also 
either “contact[] [a] grand jury directly” or “appear before a . . . state judicial 
official and swear out a complaint against a suspected criminal.”
46
 Further, Con-
gress passed a variety of qui tam provisions, which directly authorized individu-
als to sue under criminal statutes to enforce the law.
47
 Qui tam actions limited 




Meanwhile, from 1800 to 1814, the Attorney General often played the role of 
“an absentee cabinet member.”
49
 It was not until 1819 that the Attorney General 
even received a physical office.
50
 Members of Congress opposed his receiving a 
clerk because to do so would countenance the creation of a Department of Law, 
“never intended certainly when th[e] office was established.”
51
 Congress also 
viewed the Attorney General specifically as a personal aide to the President. One 
Senator noted in 1809 that of course the President supported enhancing the At-
torney General’s position, in part, by raising the salary, because “[t]he President 
having a right to appoint an Attorney General, his opinion might be procured in 
favor of the application of the money.”
52
 Despite executive complaints about the 
lack of coordination in the Department, Congress transferred supervision of the 
District Attorneys from the State Department to an agent of the Treasury De-
partment, rather than giving more power to the Attorney General.
53
 In 1820, At-
torney General William Wirt complained to Congress that he had inherited an 
office bereft of any institutional memory (including the records and advice of his 
predecessors), and one that lacked the legal authority to truly command the Dis-
trict Attorneys throughout the country.
54
 Wirt argued that this state of affairs 
 
45. See Krent, supra note 38, at 303-04. 
46. Id. at 294. 
47. See Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 12, 2 Stat. 329, 331 (criminalizing specific types of trade with 
Indian Tribes and entitling the “informant” to half of the forfeitures accrued under the Act); 
Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (criminalizing importation of liquor without 
paying duties, and allowing the person who first discovers a violation to collect half of the 
forfeiture). 
48. See Krent, supra note 38, at 297-98. 
49. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 41, at 78. 
50. See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 54, 3 Stat. 496, 500 (appropriating funds to maintain the Attorney 
General’s office). 
51. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 61 (1817). 
52. 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 1572 (1809) (statement of Sen. Rowan). 
53. Krent, supra note 38, at 287-88. 
54. 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2463, 2464-65 (1820) (letter from the Attorney General’s Office). 
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Despite these expressions of frustration, for most of the nineteenth century, 
Congress continued to resist executive demands to centralize the law enforce-
ment apparatus. In 1830, for example, the Senate debated but took no action on 
a “bill to organize the Attorney General’s department, and to erect it into an Ex-
ecutive office.”
56
 Some senators bemoaned the “wretched” state of the “Law De-
partment.”
57
 They remained most concerned with “the incompetency of the 
United States’ District Attorneys” who had not been properly collecting reve-
nue.
58
 But most senators resisted centralization. One proclaimed that organiza-
tional innovation was “unnecessary,”
59
 and another, Senator Daniel Webster, ar-
gued that no “good would result from the metamorphosis of the Attorney 
General into the head of a bureau.”
60
 Senators expressed a fear that the Attorney 
General, who “should be engaged in studying his books of law,” would instead 
be distracted by administrative (i.e., supervisory) duties.
61
 
The District Attorney position, meanwhile, enjoyed virtually unlimited in-
dependence. The attorneys lived and worked throughout the country. There was 
no formal chain of command within the executive branch. Furthermore, the at-
torneys often lacked a means of effective communication with national officials.
62
 
Even after Congress gave the Attorney General formal control over the District 
Attorneys, the Attorney General remained relatively powerless in practice. He 
advised the District Attorneys only on cases of “‘peculiar’ importance” and could 
not discipline misconduct.
63
 The District Attorneys remained confused over 
whether they should report to the Attorney General or the Treasury Department, 




55. Id. at 2466. 
56. 6 REG. DEB. 322 (1830) (description of bill); id. at 324 (statement of Sen. King) (asserting that 
“there was no probability that a final decision could be made at present on the bill before the 
Senate”). 
57. Id. at 323 (statement of Sen. McKinley). 
58. Id. at 276 (statement of Sen. Rowan). 
59. Id. at 323 (statement of Sen. Holmes). 
60. Id. at 324 (statement of Sen. Webster). 
61. Id. at 277 (statement of Sen. Webster). 
62. See Beale, supra note 8, at 394. 
63. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 41, at 219 (quoting Attorney General Jeremiah Black). 
64. Id. 
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til 1854, the various Attorneys General kept up significant private practices, and 
many of them did not even live in Washington, D.C.
65
 
This state of affairs cannot be attributed to executive indifference on the sub-
ject. Congress continued to delegate oversight authority to the Treasury Depart-
ment despite ardent calls for reform from Presidents James Madison, Andrew 
Jackson, and Franklin Pierce, among others.
66
 In 1854, for example, President 
Pierce forwarded a letter to Congress from his Attorney General Caleb Cushing, 
appealing for more centralized authority within the Department as a means of 
enhancing executive authority. Cushing grounded his claims in “constitutional 
theory,” arguing that the “ultimate discretion, when the law does not speak, 
must reside, as to all executive matters, with the President who has the power to 
appoint and remove, and whose duty it is to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”
67 
He continued that “executive discretion . . . requires unity of execu-
tive action, and, of course, unity of executive decision.”
68
 Whatever the merits of 
his constitutional arguments, Congress rejected them, and it would take a civil 
war before such pleas would fall on more sympathetic ears.
69
 
B. Congressional Centralization: The Creation of the Department of Justice 
Contrary to most scholarly depictions,
70
 the creation of the Department of 
Justice did not represent a congressional concession to this almost century-long 
push by the executive branch for greater authority over the administration of 
justice. Nor did it serve as a culmination of congressional effort to more effec-
tively enforce civil rights.
71
 Instead, members of Congress themselves became 
 
65. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization With-
out Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014). 
66. Id. at 132-34. 
67. CALEB CUSHING, A REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUGGESTING MODIFICATIONS IN THE 
MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE LEGAL BUSINESS OF THE GOVERNMENT: MESSAGE FROM THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 33-95, at 11-12 (1854). 
68. Id. at 12. 
69. See Shugerman, supra note 65, at 134. 
70. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 438 (2011) (giving one such scholarly depiction of the Department of 
Justice as a concession to “centralized control”). 
71. Compare Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 
IND. L.J. 1297, 1297, 1300-01 (2000) (describing the conventional view that Congress, through 
establishment of the first Solicitor General, hoped to enforce the Civil War Amendments), 
with Shugerman, supra note 65, at 148-64 (offering a persuasive rebuke of this “conventional 
explanation”). 
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concerned with the independence of the District Attorneys and the difficulties of 
controlling their financial expenditures. In other words, they feared that the ad-
ministration of justice was spiraling out of their control, and they acquiesced to 
the creation of a Department with more formal fiscal constraints prescribed by 
Congress. 
Congress became increasingly concerned with fiscal efficiency and promot-
ing uniformity of the legal advice given to various actors within the federal gov-
ernment. On the financial side of the equation, members of Congress evinced 
great alarm over the fees being sent to outside counsel by District Attorneys.
72
 
By 1867, the government was spending over $100,000 a year on outside coun-
sel.
73
 In some cases, the amount paid to a single outside attorney exceeded the 
salary of the Attorney General.
74
 Monitoring these disparate lawyers proved im-
possible. Representative Thomas Jenckes, a sponsor of the bill to create the De-
partment, noted that in one instance the government sent $10,000 to retain an 
“eminent lawyer” in New York, “but we cannot find that he ever did anything.”
75
 
The Senate also evinced concern with these fiscal issues, passing a formal reso-
lution requesting that Attorney General Henry Stanbery inform the Senate the 
“amount . . . paid by the United States for special counsel” and whether “the 
present force in the Attorney General’s office is sufficient.”
76
 Stanberry re-
sponded that “[t]he present force in the office of the Attorney General is not 
sufficient for the proper business of that office.”
77
 
Another concern reflected in congressional debates was the sheer number of 
disparate legal opinions proliferating around the various agencies and branches 
of government. The “bill is necessary . . . to secure uniformity in the legal advice 
given to the President . . . and [other] officers,” noted one representative.
78
 “We 
have now this great anomaly,” explained another, “[whereby] the Attorney Gen-
eral is bound to conduct all the cases of the United States in the Supreme Court 
of the United States; yet in the majority of instances he never hears of the cases 
 
72. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3034-40 (1870) (debating the Department of Justice). 
73. Id. at 3036 (statement of Rep. Jenckes). 
74. Id. at 3035. 
75. Id. at 3036. 
76. S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 13, at 1-2 (1867) (Letter from Attorney General Henry Stanbery to the Sen-




77. Id. at 2. 
78. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3038 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). 
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until the printed record is in his hands.”
79
 On paper, the Act to Establish the 
Department of Justice enhanced the Attorney General’s authority by granting 
him more supervisory authority. The Act also created a new position, the Solic-
itor General, who would try cases in the Supreme Court.
80
 In other words, even 
in centralizing authority, Congress divided that authority at the center itself. 
The resulting Department further bears out the fiscal rather than political 
motivations behind its creation. Little changed, as a practical matter, as the var-
ious prosecutors scattered across the nation after the formal creation of the DOJ 
in 1870. Congress continued to promote the relative independence of U.S. Attor-
neys in myriad ways. For example, Congress did not initially give the new De-
partment an office. The Department’s members remained ensconced in various 
federal agencies.
81
 The dispersion of authority down the chain of command con-




This is not to say that in this interbranch struggle the Executive always ceded 
to congressional demands. As the executive and legislative branches fought for 
control over prosecution, the two branches also clashed over the law enforce-
ment agencies that would support that system. At the turn of the century, federal 
prosecutors relied on Secret Service agents within the Treasury Department for 
investigatory services.
83
 During the tenure of President Teddy Roosevelt, these 
agents began targeting members of Congress in a series of fraud investigations.
84
 
Congress then “struck back,” passing a bill prohibiting the appropriation of 
funds for this Secret Service loan program.
85
 In response, President Roosevelt’s 
Attorney General began hiring agents of his own—these agents would soon 
comprise what we now know of as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
86
 
Yet the decentralized structure of federal criminal law endured—a structure 
that Congress continued to promote. For example, Congress enacted a signifi-
cant change in the organization of the Department that further promoted pros-
ecutorial discretion: its compensation scheme. By supplying prosecutor salaries 
on an annual rather than a “per case” basis (as was done previously), Congress 
 
79. Id. at 3036 (statement of Rep. Jenckes). 
80. Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, §§ 1-5, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (1870). 
81. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 41, at 228. 
82. Congress was dominated by Republicans, and the Presidency was occupied by Republican 
Ulysses S. Grant. 
83. RONALD KESSLER, THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE FBI 9 (2003). 
84. DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 4 (2018). 
85. Id.; see also Act of May 27, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-141, 35 Stat. 317, 328. 
86. RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 84, at 4. 
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directly encouraged the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
87
 It was not until 
1870 that the Attorney General finally wrested full control of the District Attor-
neys from the Treasury Department,
88
 and not until 1919 that the Criminal Di-
vision was established.
89




C. Into the Modern Era 
Not only did prosecutorial dispersion survive bureaucratic attempts at cen-
tralization, it also persisted in the face of the rapid proliferation of federal crim-
inal statutes. From its ignoble beginnings, the reach of the Justice Department 
has expanded a great deal in the modern era. Congress can, in part, claim re-
sponsibility for this growth. During the twentieth century, Congress began as-
serting its control over federal criminal prosecution in a more traditional way—
by passing an enormous number of statutes.
91
 As the Supreme Court embraced 
an expanded understanding of the Commerce Clause power, Congress flooded 
the law books with “a steady progression of statutes targeting criminal behavior 
that had long been the exclusive province of state and local enforcers.”
92
 
The pace at which Congress has passed federal criminal laws has increased 
spectacularly since 1900, particularly since 1970.
93
 Many of the earlier statutes 
stemmed from congressional concern over national moral crusades, such as pro-
hibition.
94
 By the 1960s and 70s, public concern with organized crime resulted 
in a deluge of federal criminal statutes.
95
 And the 1980s and 90s brought addi-
tional attention to violent crime, including firearm offenses.
96
 By the mid-90s, 
 
87. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940, at 277 (2013) (arguing that desire for forbearance motivated the 
change in compensation scheme). 
88. Shugerman, supra note 65, at 132. 
89. About the Criminal Division: History, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov
/criminal/history [https://perma.cc/5F8F-TQX6]. 
90. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 41 (1982) (“Local U.S. attorneys . . . [maintained] 
an independent political base and a tenuous institutional loyalty to the Justice Depart-
ment . . . .”). 
91. RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 84, at 4. 
92. Id. at 5. 
93. Id. at 6-7. 
94. Beale, supra note 6, at 41. 
95. Id. at 42. 
96. Id. at 43. 
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there were more than 3,000 federal crimes,
97




Yet the congressional “scale-up” of the late twentieth century did not precip-
itate a significant change in the DOJ’s organization and indeed directly contrib-
uted to its currently decentralized nature.
99
 Consider the way this system func-
tions today. There are 5,800 federal prosecutors, managing approximately 
70,000 cases per year, located in the 94 disparate USAOs.
100 
This system does 
not operate in a vacuum. As will be outlined below, U.S. Attorneys have their 
own local power bases and are often also accountable to local political leaders. 
And, federal prosecutors necessarily form relationships with all levels of law en-
forcement. Cases are brought to each office by a variety of federal and local en-
forcement bureaus.
101
 For most crimes, a local, state, or federal prosecutor has 
the power to bring criminal charges.
102 
The vast majority of federal criminal 
 
97. Id. at 44. 
98. The precise number of federal crimes is impossible to know, but estimates today range around 
4,000. John S. Baker, Jr. & Dale E. Bennett, Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Criminal 
Legislation, FEDERALIST SOC’Y 8 (2004), http://fedsoc.server326.com/Publications 
/practicegroupnewsletters/criminallaw/crimreportfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LD9 
-MVMT]; see also Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are 
Ensnared, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703
749504576172714184601654 [https://perma.cc/5JJK-FNEC] (noting that the number is “im-
possible to count” but that the ABA concluded that, in the 1990s, the number was well over 
3,000). The story of the growth of federal criminal law is most effectively conveyed in RICH-
MAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 84, at 1-10. 
99. Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—the Center Doesn’t, 117 
YALE L.J. 1374, 1400 (2008). 
100. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OF UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (Nov. 2008), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/EOUSA/a0903 
/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VE9-9AWV]; Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Ad-
ministration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 851 (2015); see also Memorandum from 
the Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Att’ys and Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim-
inal Div. 1 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23
/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist 
-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/33NE-9EVY] (“When making 
these individualized assessments, prosecutors must take into account numerous factors, such 
as . . . the needs of communities [they] serve.”); Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the 
Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 643 
(2011) (noting the “DOJ is a fragmented agency, one in which several autonomous decision-
makers help shape enforcement policy,” and in which U.S. Attorneys “have tremendous power 
over federal criminal law enforcement and a great deal of independence from the DOJ in 
Washington”). 
101. Richman, supra note 99, at 1379. 
102. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 519, 521 (2011). 
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cases involve federal statutes with state or local counterparts.
103 
Operating in 
overlapping jurisdictions requires careful coordination so as to avoid conflict and 
to promote the sharing of experiences and resources.
104
 
Take, for example, a New York police officer who uncovers a narcotics con-
spiracy running from Brooklyn to Manhattan. This officer could, at a minimum, 
bring the case to the Manhattan District Attorney, the Brooklyn District Attor-
ney, the New York State Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, or the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. 
This means that federal officials must compete and cooperate with local officials 
and with one another for cases and that they interact on a constant basis.
105
 Each 
office necessarily varies in its structure, staff, and workload, making uniform 
oversight impossible.
106
 Today’s Attorney General cannot possibly be relied 
upon to control all these moving pieces. Prosecuting criminal law is but one task 
among many delegated to the DOJ. The Attorney General also oversees most 
federal law enforcement from the FBI to the Drug Enforcement Agency, along 
with a huge variety of civil litigation matters, serves on the President’s Cabinet, 
and acts as one of the President’s legal advisors.
107
 Moreover, an increase in re-
sources in Main Justice has also corresponded with a concurrent shift in the 
USAOs, which now have larger, more experienced staffs.
108
 
The preceding history is crucial for understanding the decentralized nature 
of the DOJ in the face of rapid administrative centralization in almost all other 
areas. Whereas most federal agencies began with a strong organization in Wash-
ington and gradually delegated responsibilities to “field offices,” the Department 
of Justice evolved in precisely the opposite direction.
109
 U.S. Attorneys operated 
independently of centralized control for almost a century.
110
 According to many 
scholars, this pedigree produced a “degree of autonomy and independence from 
 
103. See Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case 
Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 244 (2005) (“In 1997, only 
about 5% of all federal criminal cases involved federal statutes with no local or state counter-
part.”). 
104. Id. 
105. See Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 16, at 760-61. 
106. Id. 
107. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecu-
torial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 197 (2008). 
108. Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States Attorneys’ Of-
fices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 282, 288 (2002). 
109. JAMES W. FESLER, AREA AND ADMINISTRATION 64 (1949). 
110. EISENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 11. 
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the department perhaps unmatched by any other field service in the federal gov-
ernment.”
111
 While the field offices of long-centralized agencies remained under 
the close scrutiny of their supervisors in Washington, the Attorney General never 
came close to exerting the same level of control over federal prosecutors. Legis-
lators, for their part, continued to be “surprisingly loath to enlist Washington to 
manage field operations” in the criminal-justice sphere.
112
 All of these forces 
combined to form a system in which commentators agree that “[n]o government 




Congressional desire for a decentralized structure has been manifest 
throughout the history recounted above. Indeed, evidence abounds of congres-
sional desire to retain criminal-enforcement authority at the periphery even in 
more recent years. Consider how Congress has wielded its power of the purse. 
As Dan Richman has noted, legislators have recommended moving decision-
making power away from Main Justice and toward the local USAOs.
114
 Congress 
has capped the number of personnel that could work in Main Justice, without 
similarly limiting hiring in USAOs. In the late 1990s, legislators proposed trans-
ferring personnel from Main Justice to the districts.
115
 Subsequently, Congress 
passed the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act, which di-
rected the Attorney General to move two hundred federal prosecutors from Main 
Justice to the various USAOs, while also authorizing the hiring of ninety-four 
additional Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
116
 In other words, not only has Congress 
considered and rejected centralizing authority within the DOJ, it has taken active 
measures to send more power (in the form of resources and broad statutes) away 
from Main Justice. 
 
111. Id. 
112. Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2087, 2094 (2009). 
113. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
959, 960 (2009). 
114. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 16, at 806 (quoting Theodora Galacatos, Note, 
The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case Study of Inter- and 
Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 659 (1995)). 
115. H.R. REP. NO. 105-526, at 4 (1998) (proposing allowing the Attorney General to appoint two 
hundred new Assistant U.S. Attorneys from the ranks of Main Justice, with each position in 
Washington terminated upon the appointment of its incumbent to a U.S. Attorney’s Office). 
116. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 103-104, 116 
Stat. 1758, 1766 (2002). 
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i i .  present-day prosecutors: the executive strikes back? 
The history of congressional efforts to protect prosecutorial dispersion does 
not mean that the Executive has no tools for centralizing authority, nor that the 
DOJ has not achieved any centralized control. Indeed, one anticipating a robust 
interbranch struggle would expect no less. A number of tools have gained par-
ticular resonance, among them the U.S. Attorney selection process and directives 
from Main Justice, including Attorney General guidance memos and the Justice 
Manual.
117
 A discussion of those tools, however, reveals the way in which the 
structure of the DOJ frustrates many top-down initiatives to assert control. To 
this day, across a variety of salient policy areas, U.S. Attorneys and their line as-
sistants have varied enforcement priorities depending on the preferences of their 
districts, sometimes in direct contravention of Main Justice directives. 
This discussion also demonstrates the forces that might cause members of 
Congress and their respective U.S. Attorneys to push back against executive top-
down directives. In turn, these motivations begin to reveal the benefits of a de-
centralized structure from a separation-of-powers perspective. When accusa-
tions of politicization proliferate and executive policy priorities conflict with state 
and local law enforcement priorities, Congress is likely to resist the Executive 
because of popular distaste for politicization of agency functions and support 
from their own constituents for state and local priorities. Even as this study de-
fends the dispersed structure of federal criminal law, however, the discussion be-
low also highlights the benefits of both Congress and the Executive forcefully 
competing for control of the federal criminal system. This discussion highlights 
one salient benefit: the interbranch struggle over various policies related to fed-
eral criminal law publicizes controversial enforcement choices, promoting trans-
parency within a relatively opaque system. 
A. U.S. Attorney Selection and Removal 
The primary formal presidential mechanism of control over the Attorney 
General and U.S. Attorneys is the mandate that they serve by law at the pleasure 




117. In recent years, the President and Main Justice have, for example, asserted formal authority 
over all federal civil litigation and succeeded in prohibiting U.S. Attorneys and assistants from 
engaging in private practice. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUS-
TICE MANUAL § 4.1.100, https://www.justice.gov/usam [https://perma.cc/Z4R5-JCWR] 
(listing Justice Department policies); see also Barkow, supra note 102, at 525 (commenting on 
the mechanisms by which the DOJ has been centralized over the past few decades). 
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (2018). 
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The President maintains a great deal of discretion in appointing his Attorney 
General, but senators serve a critical advisory role in the selection of U.S. Attor-
neys.
119
 Some senators are more interested in U.S. Attorney selection than oth-
ers, but all nominees remain subject to a “blue slip” process whereby senators 
can effectively veto a potential nomination.
120
 A survey of U.S. Attorneys from 
the 1970s notes that because U.S. Attorneys owe their appointments to their 
home senators, they can have a “divided or ambiguous sense of allegiance.”
121
 
The character of the U.S. Attorney nomination process, which is district spe-
cific, serves to enhance Congress’s influence. Members of Congress all acting at 
once face severe collective-action problems vis-à-vis the President. Yet when 
those same members delegate their authority to the representatives of one state 
by agreeing to defer to those representatives’ preferences, they can wield their 
power more effectively. To provide a more concrete example, pursuant to a cus-
tom known as senatorial courtesy, senators collectively agree to oppose nominees 
who are opposed by the senators from the state where they will serve.
122
 This 
custom allows the Senate to “significantly constrain[] the President’s decision 
making.”
123
 Senators have historically been more successful in influencing pres-
idential nominations when the nominee is to serve in one state as opposed to 
nominees that will serve in the Cabinet or oversee a program in many states.
124
 
Congress recognizes this dynamic. Senators have “refused to give up control over 
regional appointments . . . [of] U.S. Attorneys . . . because those persons would 
set policy regionally in a way that was sensitive to the needs of a members’ [sic] 
reelection coalition.”
125
 Their authority over their U.S. Attorneys, including their 
selections, causes legislators to value district autonomy because it provides a po-
tential source of personal leverage and localized benefits to their constituents.
126
 
The character and conduct of the U.S. Attorneys further illustrate congres-
sional influence. The U.S. Attorneys enjoy stronger relationships with their 
home states and their members of Congress than do Main Justice appointees. 
 
119. See Beale, supra note 8, at 409-10. 
120. Michael J. Nelson & Ian Ostrander, Keeping Appointments: The Politics of Confirming United 
States Attorneys, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 211, 211 (2016). 
121. Griffin B. Bell & Daniel J. Meador, Appointing United States Attorneys, 9 J.L. & POL. 247, 248-
49 (1993). 
122. MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE 23-31 (2008). 
123. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s Unitary Executive, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 701, 706 (2009). 
124. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 566 n.44 (2005) (providing one example). 
125. DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BU-
REAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 65 (2008). 
126. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 16, at 805-10. 
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Indeed, when President Clinton assumed office, several senators picked their re-
spective U.S. Attorneys themselves.
127
 From 1981 to 2015, across the federal gov-
ernment, nearly thirty percent of political appointees lived in the Washington 
metropolitan area at the time of their nomination.
128
 U.S. Attorneys provide an 
exception: they are generally drawn from the district in which they serve.
129
 In-
stead of being Washington insiders, sent to various districts to enforce criminal 
laws, U.S. Attorneys often either live in or did live in their districts for a signifi-
cant period at the time of their nomination. Furthermore, Justice Department 
documents indicate sustained efforts by representatives to monitor U.S. Attor-
neys beyond the confirmation process. For example, the U.S. Attorney firing 
scandal revealed that representatives in western states have urged their U.S. At-
torneys to pursue specific categories of prosecutions.
130
 
The President’s ability to unilaterally remove any U.S. Attorney has mean-
while not generally proved meaningful in practice. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the President has the authority to fire U.S. Attorneys at will, even 
if they are technically given a statutory term of four years.
131
 But, as Adrian Ver-
meule has shown, Presidents usually observe a set of “conventions” regarding 
U.S. Attorney tenure that strike a balance between presidential control, congres-
sional influence, and prosecutorial independence.
132
 Generally, when a new 
President assumes office, all U.S. Attorneys submit their resignations, but if a 
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sentatives Darrell Issa and F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. to monitor Lam). 
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The interbranch struggle for control of federal criminal prosecution revealed 
itself quite forcefully during the George W. Bush Administration, which alleg-
edly attempted to use U.S. Attorney selection and removal as a means of central-
izing political control over the entire DOJ. The DOJ began not only enforcing 
“rigid” uniformities in certain policy areas, but also appointing U.S. Attorneys 
from posts within the Administration who lacked strong ties to their districts. 
According to the Washington Post, by 2007, almost four dozen new U.S. Attor-




Most significant for our purposes, President Bush made unprecedented ef-
forts to wield his appointment and removal power with unilateral force. The 
Bush Administration called on a congressional staffer to insert a provision into 
the Patriot Act Reauthorization Bill allowing the White House to fill a U.S. At-
torney vacancy indefinitely without Senate confirmation.
135
 An internal memo 
written by the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales made the goal 
of outflanking Congress explicit: “By not going the PAS [Senate confirmation] 
route, we can give far less deference to home-State Senators and thereby get (1) 
our preferred person appointed and (2) do it far faster and more efficiently, at 
less political cost to the White House.”
136
 
This attempt to bypass Congress, however, ultimately met a disastrous fate. 
In 2006, President Bush violated the “convention” of U.S. Attorney tenure by 
firing nine of his U.S. Attorneys midterm.
137
 Many believed the firings were re-
lated to specific criminal-prosecution decisions and that the entire Department 
was being “politicized.”
138
 Some suggested, for example, that U.S. Attorneys 
were fired for the way they handled public-corruption cases involving Demo-
 
[https://perma.cc/49MC-UX8D] (explaining that “in late 2006 and early 2007,” nine U.S. 
Attorneys were directed by senior Justice Department officials to resign, causing “members of 
Congress . . . to raise questions and concerns about the reasons for the removals, including 
whether they were intended to influence certain prosecutions”). Viewed in this context, the 
firing of U.S. Attorneys at the onset of the Trump Administration provided the rule rather 
than the exception. See Erica Orden & Nicole Hong, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Fired After 
Refusing Justice Department Request to Quit, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2017, 7:12 PM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-attorney-preet-bharara-defies-trump-request-to-resign 
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135. Richman, supra note 112, at 2106. 
136. INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 133, at 36. 
137. See id. 
138. Vermeule, supra note 132, at 1202. 




 The congressional backlash was vociferous and bipartisan. Certainly, 
Democratic members of Congress were more vocal in their condemnation, but 
members of both parties criticized the President’s decision.
140
 Hearings and an 
investigation by the Justice Department’s Inspector General quickly ensued. 
Members of Congress “excoriated” the Justice Department’s political leadership 
during these hearings.
141
 Attorney General Gonzales soon resigned. 
The congressional response to the U.S. Attorney firings is notable when 
compared to similar firings of other Bush-era executive-branch officials. 
Whereas the U.S. Attorney firings generated hearings, an Inspector General re-
port, and massive media coverage, the demotion and reassignment of attorneys 
within the Civil Rights Division received scant attention.
142
 By the end of Bush’s 
term, the dynamic between Congress and the President regarding the U.S. At-
torney position returned to “normal.”
143
 Legislators remained committed to de-




B. Directives from Main Justice 
Once a U.S. Attorney has been appointed, the Executive and more-closely 
aligned officials at Main Justice have other ways of exercising control beyond 
simply removing him or her. These control mechanisms—most prominent 
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143. Richman, supra note 112, at 2116. 
144. Id.; see also Barkow, supra note 100, at 852 (“[P]residential removal authority over prosecutors 
has grown limited as a matter of practice.”). 
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among them the Justice Manual (previously known as the U.S. Attorneys’ Man-
ual) and DOJ guidance memoranda—have proliferated and grown more effec-
tive in recent decades. But they continue, at least at this juncture, to provide an 
imperfect means of enforcing top-down directives. Historically, they have suc-
cessfully signaled administration priorities, but the imposition of anything close 
to federal “uniformity” in the domain of criminal enforcement remains elusive. 
The President and the Attorney General can most swiftly implement enforce-
ment policies via the issuance of memoranda sent from the Attorney General and 
addressed to all active U.S. Attorneys. These memoranda touch on a range of 
subjects, from settlement payments to third parties and discovery-related issues 
to the most controversial criminal-enforcement issues of the era.
145
 These direc-
tives cannot be found in the Code of Federal Regulations, nor do they carry any 
legislative authority. Not surprisingly then, U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys have historically expressed varying levels of compliance with them. 
“In all my time there,” reported one former U.S. Attorney, “I never did read the 
damn Manual.”
146
 As Rachel Barkow noted more recently, “While the DOJ can 
produce guiding memos and principles, it is simply not possible for it to police 
how each U.S. Attorney proceeds.”
147
 
These directives do serve two important purposes beyond providing general 
guidance. First, they signal Main Justice priorities. For example, former Attorney 
General Sessions used a public memorandum to announce an important shift in 
the Department’s pursuit of mandatory-minimum sentences.
148
 Soon thereafter, 
the Department updated the Manual to note that “the ultimate measure of the 
potential for effective prosecution . . . is the sentence . . . that is likely to be im-
posed if the person is convicted.”
149
 
Second, Washington exerts direct control by imposing requirements for 
Main Justice approval of certain prosecutions and appeals. Areas now formally 
requiring approval include civil rights crimes, terrorism matters, death penalty 
 
145. See, e.g., Memorandum from Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Component Heads & 
U.S. Att’ys (June 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/971826/download 
[https://perma.cc/M44D-336L] (discussing settlement guidance); Memorandum from Da-
vid W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Dep’t Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors [https://
perma.cc/UFF3-TDEM] (discussing discovery guidance). 
146. EISENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 67. 
147. Barkow, supra note 100, at 853-54. 
148. Memorandum from Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc
/UR2N-NQJA]. 
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cases, and the “arrest of foreign nationals.”
150
 Bringing any criminal appeal re-
mains subject to Main Justice approval, and often entails either central oversight 
or direct intervention, a process outlined in detail in the Justice Manual.
151
 Ad-
ditionally, pursuant to the federal electronic-surveillance statutes, Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys must seek DOJ approval for the use of certain investigative techniques, 
such as wiretaps.
152
 Another successful initiative to date promoted by Main Jus-
tice and incorporated into the Manual has been Main Justice oversight of the 
federal death penalty. The “Death Penalty Protocol,” first issued by Attorney 
General Janet Reno, requires notification of the Attorney General of the existence 
of a “death-eligible” case, regardless of whether the prosecutor plans to seek the 
death penalty.
153
 The Bush DOJ embraced this new procedure and began over-
riding local decisions in the death penalty area with a more forceful hand.
154
 
Yet even conceding these pockets of Main Justice control, USAOs retain a 
remarkable degree of autonomy. Indeed, given the current structure of the DOJ, 
capital cases are one of the few areas that the Department can effectively monitor 
because such prosecutions arise so infrequently. As of July 2017, only two percent 
of the nation’s death row prisoners were sentenced in federal court.
155
 Further-
more, in areas such as the appeals process, the benefits of imposing a uniform 
oversight policy and the ability to effectively monitor align. Put differently, it 
makes good sense for Main Justice to intervene when an appeal risks generating 
precedent that will affect multiple USAOs. As they currently stand, however, 
many Main Justice directives still suffer both procedurally, from their lack of en-
forcement mechanisms, and substantively, from their intentional vagueness. 
The directives are usually imprecise because “they need to speak to all possible 
cases that can be brought” and seek to over- rather than underdeter unlawful 
conduct.
156
 The DOJ has ultimately issued only a “small handful of memos on 
particular laws [that] do not address how resources should be prioritized in the 
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context of the thousands of the other federal criminal statutes for which there 
are no such DOJ memos.”
157
 
The issuance of memoranda concerning two of the most salient policy areas 
for DOJ guidance—sentencing and marijuana regulation—reveals the way that 
the DOJ’s structure frustrates the current means of imposing top-down policy 
directives. First, guidance memoranda regarding sentencing have proliferated 
over the last few administrations.
158
 While sentencing remains theoretically in 
the hands of the judge, given the existence of the Sentencing Guidelines and 
various mandatory-minimum provisions, a prosecutor’s decisions whether to 
charge a defendant and what types of charges to bring are far more determinative 
of the sentence than any other factor.
159
 
Beginning with Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, the DOJ has issued 
a series of directives with more prescriptive and specific language regarding plea 
bargaining and sentencing.
160
 Attorney General John Ashcroft continued this 
practice, dictating that prosecutors were to “charge and pursue the most serious, 
readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case.”
161
 
Subsequent administrations have continued the battle of the sentencing memo-
randa. The famous “Holder Memo” issued by one of President Obama’s Attor-
neys General, Eric Holder, urged that the most “severe mandatory minimum[s]” 
should be “reserved for serious, high-level, or violent drug traffickers.”
162
 It out-
lined specific criteria prosecutors should consider when deciding which drug-
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(Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm [https://
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related charges to bring.
163
 The Trump Administration reversed course. “[P]ros-
ecutors,” urged then-Attorney General Sessions, “should charge and pursue the 
most serious, readily provable offense.”
164
 
As Kate Stith argues, these memoranda seek to centralize the exercise of 
prosecutorial power by delegitimating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
165
 
But they also pose practical problems. They offer no mechanism by which to 
monitor the exercise of discretion by individual line prosecutors. Indeed, the 
Holder Memo actually condoned sentencing variation, noting that “[w]hen 
making these individualized assessments, prosecutors must take into account 
numerous factors, such as . . . the needs of communities [they] serve.”
166
 As 
Stith concluded in 2008, “There may well come a day when Main Justice fully 
takes control of all charging discretion, but that day has not yet come.”
167
 
Ten years later, that day has still not come: variance pervades the system. 
Districts vary widely in their policies about which cases to prosecute, what kinds 
of plea agreements to offer, and when and how to move for departure from the 
Sentencing Guidelines.
168
 For example, according to a study by the Sentencing 
Commission, in the District of Connecticut, around 27% of defendants received 
a sentence within the Guidelines range, and 33% received a sentence below the 
Guidelines range. In the Eastern District of Kentucky, 60% of defendants re-
ceived a sentence in the Guidelines range, and 21% received a sentence below the 
Guidelines range.
169
 Congress has also passed legislation allowing for commu-
nity-based considerations in sentencing, noting that “community norms con-
cerning particular criminal behavior might be justification for increasing or de-
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/download [https://perma.cc/UC2P-L69T]. 
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167. Stith, supra note 27, at 1450. 




170. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 170 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4)-(5) (2018) (mandating that the 
Sentencing Commission take community norms into account in creating the Sentencing 
Guidelines). 
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These variations reveal that U.S. Attorneys have differed in their responses 
to Main Justice directives, and they have been aided by Congress in their re-
sistance efforts. As the above statistics bear out, discretionary authority is not 
always to the benefit of criminal defendants, depending on the district and issue 
in question. In 2014, when the Department, through the Attorney General, urged 
legislative reforms to mandatory-minimum sentencing laws, an organization of 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys sent a letter to Congress objecting to those reforms be-




In another prominent example of resistance to Main Justice directives, sev-
eral members of Congress and U.S. Attorneys refused to follow former Attorney 
General Sessions’s memorandum directing more sustained enforcement of stat-
utes criminalizing marijuana possession and distribution. Upon assuming office, 
Sessions rescinded the “Cole Memo,” which had announced that the DOJ would 
not challenge the states’ marijuana legalization initiatives.
172
 After the release of 
Sessions’s memo, several senators and representatives spoke out against Main 
Justice’s shift in policy. “Colorado had every right to legalize marijuana, and I 
will do everything I can to protect that right against the power of an overreaching 
federal government,” Republican Representative Mike Coffman of Colorado as-
serted.
173
 Colorado Senators Michael Bennet (D) and Cory Gardner (R) united 
in their efforts to confront the Justice Department.
174
 
Many U.S. Attorneys followed Congress’s lead rather than the Attorney Gen-
eral’s command. For example, Colorado U.S. Attorney Bob Troyer announced 
that his office would not modify how it prosecuted marijuana-related offenses 
despite the shift in federal guidance.
175
 In Pennsylvania (where marijuana use 
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has been legalized for medical purposes), U.S. Attorney David Freed met with 
Pennsylvania’s congressional representatives and announced that “my office has 
no intention of disrupting Pennsylvania’s medical marijuana program or re-
lated financial transactions.”
176
 David C. Weiss, the U.S. Attorney for Delaware, 
responded that taking action against his state’s medical marijuana industry was 
“certainly not a priority.”
177
 He made this statement four days after Delaware 
Senator Chris Coons noted that prosecuting legal marijuana industries would be 
a “poor allocation of federal time, money, and manpower that should be focused 
on more important things, such as combatting crime on our streets.”
178
 
Members of Congress successfully backed up their rhetoric with action in 
this area. First, Congress renewed an appropriations rider barring the DOJ from 
enforcing the federal marijuana ban against medical marijuana activities in forty-
six states.
179
 Senator Gardner also took the more dramatic step of preventing 
more than ten Justice Department nominees from getting a Senate floor vote.
180
 
Gardner refused to change course until the White House assured the Senator 
that “despite the DOJ memo, the marijuana industry in Colorado will not be 
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 President Trump then stated he would “probably” support a bill 
that would honor states’ decisions on legalizing marijuana.
182
 
These public disputes over politically targeted prosecutions, sentencing, and 
drug enforcement can play a healthy role in a democratic society, heightening 
awareness of the choices being made in disparate USAOs around the country. 
Indeed, public debates about sentencing and drug enforcement have promoted 
legislative action in an era of remarkably low congressional activity.
183
 And, while 
it is difficult to state with confidence the motivations of a diffuse, multimember 
body,
184
 the above analysis reveals that Congress has played a direct role in the 
structural development of the DOJ. This comes as no surprise given members’ 
political incentives. Members of Congress benefit from the delegation of author-
ity further down the executive-branch chain of command toward the U.S. Attor-
neys—officials over whom they exert far greater control. Moreover, because 
members of Congress answer first and foremost to their local constituents, it 
follows that they would be wary of supporting a scheme that allows federal en-
forcement priorities to intrude on state and local concerns, especially in areas as 
sensitive as criminal law enforcement.
185
 
C. A New Direction? 
The Main Justice directives regarding sentencing and marijuana enforce-
ment remain in flux as of this writing, as is the executive branch’s relationship 
with the DOJ. President Trump’s attempts to publicly influence the DOJ and 
 
181. Seung Min Kim, Trump, Gardner Strike Deal on Legalized Marijuana, Ending Standoff over 




182. Aris Folley, Trump Says He’ll Likely Support Bill Letting States Set Their Own Marijuana Policies, 
HILL (June 8, 2018, 12:23 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/391371 
-trump-says-hell-likely-support-bill-letting-states-set-their [https://perma.cc/VT2U 
-FX8Y]. 
183. Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/DV5U-N7E8]. 
184. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (“Because 
legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet dis-
coverable.”). 
185. See Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541, 1556 
(2002) (arguing that federal criminal law only presents a threat when it impedes local exper-
imentation and documenting pushback against such efforts). 
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various U.S. Attorneys have provoked renewed calls to protect the Department’s 
independence from executive-branch interference.
186
 Many of those demands 
have emanated from within Congress itself. Senator Chuck Schumer publicly 
condemned President Trump for firing the U.S. Attorney for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, Preet Bharara, noting that he was “extremely surprised and 
disappointed” by the decision.
187
 His Republican colleague Bob Corker joined 
him in denouncing the President for his “political interference” with the justice 
system, which he labeled “totally inappropriate.”
188
 Placed in historical context, 
this exchange represents merely one instance among several in the back-and-
forth between Congress and the President regarding the boundaries of control 
over the U.S. Attorney position.
189
 
Reflecting the ineffectiveness of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and Memos, 
Main Justice has now embarked on a process of transforming its means of com-
municating with all Department officials. On September 25, 2018, the Justice De-
partment announced the revised edition of its U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, now 
known as the “Justice Manual.”
190
 The Justice Department cited the need to up-
date the Manual to reflect current law, noting that its outdatedness “diminished 
the Manual’s effectiveness as an internal Department resource, and reduced its 
value as a source of transparency and accountability to the public.”
191
 Further-
more, Assistant Attorney General Rod Rosenstein cited the need to integrate De-
partment guidance found in memos into the Manual itself, claiming publicly that 
 
186. See, e.g., Bob Bauer, The Survival of Norms: The Department of Justice and the President’s ‘Absolute 
Rights,’ LAWFARE (Jan. 1, 2018, 10:00 AM EST), https://www.lawfareblog.com/survival 
-norms-department-justice-and-presidents-absolute-rights [https://perma.cc/4PJV-G668] 
(“One of the norms most clearly at risk is that which serves to safeguard the independence of 
federal law enforcement.”). 
187. Schumer ‘Disappointed’ After U.S. Attorney Bharara Removed from Office, CBS N.Y. (Mar. 12, 
2017, 2:03 PM EST), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2017/03/12/schumer-preet-bharara 
[https://perma.cc/J5TE-MTNS]. 
188. Philip Rucker & Matt Zapotosky, Trump Breaches Boundaries by Saying DOJ Should Be ‘Going 
After’ Democrats, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/trump-breaches-boundaries-by-saying-doj-should-be-going-after-democrats/2017/11/03
/1c157c08-c0aa-11e7-97d9-bdab5a0ab381_story.html [https://perma.cc/A9B3-GA8W]. 
189. President Trump himself has referred to his Department of Justice as a “deep state.” Catherine 
Lucey & Darlene Superville, Trump Accuses Department of Justice of Being Part of ‘Deep State,’ 
PBS (Jan. 2, 2018, 10:40 AM EST), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-accuses 
-justice-department-of-being-part-of-deep-state [https://perma.cc/HA39-3U6P]. 
190. Department of Justice Announces the Rollout of an Updated United States Attorneys’ Manual, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces
-rollout-updated-united-states-attorneys-manual [https://perma.cc/J232-EU3K]. 
191. Id. 
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“[m]anagement-by-memo is an inefficient and often ineffective method of en-
forcing government policies.”
192
 The new Manual includes some updates on 
high profile issues, including additional policies related to “religious liberty liti-
gation” and “disclosure of foreign influence operations.”
193
 
The name change alone reflects a greater effort by Main Justice to exert its 
influence. Rosenstein declared that the name “U.S. Attorneys’ Manual” was 
“misleading” because the Manual “applies to all components of the Department 
of Justice,” (from the Main Justice Civil Rights Division to the Office of Legal 
Counsel) not just the USAOs.
194
 These efforts likely reflect a newfound push for 
centralization by Main Justice. Yet as Main Justice has stepped up its efforts to 
exert control over USAOs in some ways, individual USAOs have continued to 
pursue prosecutions that directly implicate executive-branch officials and asso-
ciates of the President.
195
 It remains too soon to report how the latest inter- and 
intrabranch struggle for control will unfold, but many media outlets have re-
ported prosecutorial obstruction of Main Justice priorities.
196
 
The permissible bounds of executive control are beyond the scope of this 
Note. If prosecutors can in practice ignore the head of the executive branch—and 
indeed, can actively pursue criminal investigations directly implicating the Exec-
utive—it is only because of the decentralized structure that Congress has created 
and propagated. 
Ultimately this Note offers a reminder of the valuable role Congress can con-
tinue to play in promoting a decentralized regime, arguing that the benefits of 
our current system from both a federalism and separation-of-powers perspective 
are manifold. Even as this Note ultimately argues in favor of a dispersed regime, 
however, it does not suggest that the Executive (or Main Justice) should simply 
 
192. Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address on Corporate Enforcement 
Policy Before NYU Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/10/06/nyu-program-on-corporate 
-compliance-enforcement-keynote-address-october-6-2017 [https://perma.cc/L55X-TS22]. 
193. George Khoury, DOJ Unveils the Justice Manual, FINDLAW: STRATEGIST (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:00 
AM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2018/09/doj-unveils-the-justice-manual.html 
[https://perma.cc/9FHW-NDK6]. 
194. Rosenstein, supra note 192. 
195. The most prominent examples include the President’s former lawyer, Michael Cohen, see 
Steve Reilly & Brad Heath, Five Things to Know About Michael Cohen’s Guilty Plea, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 21, 2018, 9:29 PM EST), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/21
/michael-cohen-what-know-charges-he-pleaded-guilty/1058164002 [https://perma.cc
/TY4A-9Y43], and his former campaign manager, Paul Manafort, see Aruna Viswanatha, For-
mer Trump Campaign Manager Paul Manafort to Be Sentenced in February, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 
2018, 3:55 PM EST), https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-trump-campaign-manager-paul
-manafort-to-be-sentenced-in-february-1539978915 [https://perma.cc/E4GY-U35J]. 
196. See Lucey & Superville, supra note 189. 
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accede to all of Congress’s demands. Not only are there some policy areas more 
amenable to centralized control (such as the appeals process or defense of civil 
nationwide regulatory programs), but the process of negotiating the boundaries 
between Main Justice and the USAOs produces benefits in its own right. Most 
notably it brings debates about criminal-enforcement choices—from sentencing 
to drug enforcement—into public light, providing much needed transparency in 
a system full of decisions notoriously hidden from public scrutiny. 
D. Contributing Forces 
The above discussion has highlighted how conflict between Congress and 
the Executive over the organization and direction of federal criminal law has gen-
erated our current, decentralized law enforcement system. It is undeniably true, 
of course, that there is more than one factor at play in contributing to the ability 
of U.S. Attorneys and their line prosecutors to operate with autonomy. As I out-
line below, however, while these factors may contribute to decentralization’s 
sticking power, Congress deserves much of the credit for the structure of federal 
criminal law. 
First, with regard to culture, the Department has developed strong norms of 
professional independence over the course of its history.
197
 As with other admin-
istrative positions, entrenchment within the bureaucracy has enhanced individ-
ual autonomy. According to one survey of Assistant U.S. Attorneys conducted in 
2002, most assistants will “outlive” the present political regime and “their lon-
gevity as federal prosecutors tends to reinforce their view that they, rather than 
the department or the U.S. Attorney, are in the best position to set an office’s 
prosecutorial agenda.”
198
 But it should be emphasized that this culture is a result, 
not a cause, of the autonomy given to prosecutors in the first place. Culture may 
contribute to decentralization’s sticking power, but it does not account for its 
existence. The decentralized enforcement structure that surrounds criminal law 
remains of great significance. As outlined above, the power struggle between 
Congress and the President over this structure has been consistent and vocifer-
ous. At many points, Congress could have ceded to executive centralization de-
mands, yet it has refused to do so. 
Certainly, the DOJ’s decentralized structure with regard to criminal enforce-
ment may in part be the result of the nature of enforcement itself. After all, nearly 
 
197. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 
540 (2012) (quoting Maureen Mahoney et. al., Solicitors General Panel on the Legacy of the 
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1171, 1180 (2006) (comments of Walter E. 
Dellinger)); Shugerman, supra note 65, at 170. 
198. Lochner, supra note 108, at 288. 
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any enforcement action requires interaction with on-the-ground officials, wit-
nesses, and targets of investigation. Perhaps, then, the needs of an enforcement 
apparatus dictate the present-day structure of the DOJ. Strong evidence sug-
gests, however, that the DOJ’s development cannot be attributed to mere path 
dependence. A comparison of the DOJ with other agencies vested with enforce-
ment powers provides evidence to refute the path-dependency argument. Schol-
ars have previously documented the rapid centralization of the administrative 
state since the Reagan Era, including at many agencies with enforcement author-
ity.
199
 Generally, “presidential control over administration has increased.”
200
 Yet 
the DOJ has not witnessed such centralization. Even among agencies vested with 
enforcement discretion, the DOJ stands apart. 
The DOJ has a large number of field offices, each one headed by a presiden-
tial appointee confirmed by the Senate (a powerful political figure in his or her 
own right). No other agency has this amount of political firepower scattered 
across the country. Some federal agencies operate with around ten regional  
offices (and many others operate with fewer than ten).
201
 The Justice Depart-
ment oversees four times as many offices.
202
 A regional (as opposed to state) 
approach necessarily undercuts both congressional influence and state and local 
input because each regional office is responsible for multiple states.
203
 Indeed, as 
one commentator has argued, President Richard Nixon implemented the “re-
gional approach” to “standardize federal regions, thereby facilitating interagency 
coordination and presidential supervision.”
204
 
Consider the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), an 
enforcement agency located within the Department of Labor that promulgates 
standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act to enhance workplace 
safety. OSHA’s main office in Washington issues a “targeting list” that compels 
local offices to inspect specific workplaces.
205
 In fact, the “vast majority of the 
agency’s planned inspections are conducted from numbered lists distributed 
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200. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
459, 467 (2012). 
201. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 389-91 (2018). 
202. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 12. 
203. Cf. AMAR, supra note 22, at 110-11 (discussing Congress’s horizontal powers across the execu-
tive and judicial branches of the federal government, including its authority to constitute re-
gional inferior courts as well as the custom of senatorial courtesy). 
204. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 201, at 389-90. 
205. GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY: INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE 
IN GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 111 (2007). 




 Officials local to an area “choose neither which work-
places to inspect nor the order in which to visit them.”
207
 Furthermore, the agency 
promulgates regulations with regard to the appropriate response to all formal 
written complaints by an employee alleging a workplace hazard, which generally 
entails scheduling an inspection.
208
 The process is almost entirely centrally con-
trolled, and field agents retain little discretion in the enforcement process. Ac-
cording to the most prominent study of the agency, “there is little evidence of 
any direct concern for local political conditions on the part of OSHA officials in 
the national or regional offices.”
209
 
One agency that may come close to the DOJ in terms of discretion permitted 
at the field office level is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Although 
the EPA maintains only ten regional offices, they are headed by presidential ap-
pointees (although they are not confirmed by the Senate).
210
 There is some evi-
dence that the agency has varied enforcement priorities by region.
211
 The EPA’s 
enforcement discretion, however, is ultimately more constrained than that of the 
DOJ. This is in part due to regulations the agency itself has promulgated to 
maintain more uniform standards. For example, the EPA’s Clean Air Act regu-
lations direct the agency to “[a]ssure fair and uniform application by all Regional 
Offices” and “[p]rovide mechanisms for identifying and correcting inconsisten-
cies by standardizing criteria, procedures, and policies being employed by Re-
gional Office employees.”
212
 The regulations also provide that officials in the re-
gional offices “shall assure that actions taken under the act . . . [a]re as consistent 
as reasonably possible with the activities of other Regional Offices.”
213
 Federal 
courts have enforced these regulations guaranteeing uniform policies by punish-
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Despite these differences, the EPA’s structure does allow for some discretion-
ary enforcement.
215
 While the environmental context requires more study, below 
I suggest that variation may not be a cause for concern. If we think of enforce-
ment agencies on a spectrum from considerable discretion (DOJ) to almost none 
(OSHA), the EPA likely lies somewhere in the middle. Although I argue below 
that decentralization in the criminal context is on-balance beneficial, it remains 
for further study to consider whether these factors might point in the opposite 
direction for other agencies. The dynamics at play here could be at work in other 
agencies, many of which maintain some measure of decentralized enforcement, 
albeit less than the DOJ. This Note initiates that project, but it marks the begin-
ning, not the end, of the discussion. 
i i i .  the benefits and perils of decentralization 
Many—on both sides of the aisle—who have observed decentralization and 
discretion within a federal scheme have lamented it.
216
 This Part takes the oppo-
site view. The delegation of authority to lower-level executive-branch officials is 
not itself a cause for concern. First, dispersion allows for multiple actors to wield 
authority in federal criminal law enforcement, spreading power within the exec-
utive branch. Second, it necessarily leads to the formation of relationships be-
tween federal enforcement officials and state and local actors, which facilitates 
the incorporation of local needs and preferences into enforcement priorities. Fur-
thermore, these forces interact. Given the centrality of the role of federal prose-
cutors beholden to local forces in executing criminal law, Congress has empow-
ered them to provide the sort of check on executive power that it is often unable 
to provide directly.
217
 This is not to suggest that federal law enforcement is per-
fect (or even close to it), but a better understanding of the dynamics at play can 
inform more realistic and productive proposals for reforming the agency’s insti-
tutional design. 
 
215. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003) (uncovering variation in EPA enforcement practices). 
216. See sources cited supra notes 24-26; see also Broughton, supra note 5, at 458 (“Though academ-
ics and commentators across the spectrum of law and politics rarely find general agreement 
when it comes to federal power, there actually appears to be relatively broad agreement these 
days that some things about federal criminal law are not quite right. In particular, the issue 
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217. For an observation of similar forces in the cooperative-federalism context, see Bulman-Pozen, 
supra note 200, at 462. 
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A. Dispersion as a Means of Checking Presidential Power 
The diffusion of power within the Department of Justice as it regards crimi-
nal prosecution provides a practical constraint on presidential power, frustrating 
attempts at asserting formal control over the apparatus. As canvassed above, a 
debate continues to rage about the appropriate level of executive influence over 
federal criminal law enforcement.
218
 Some argue that the Executive maintains 
the constitutional prerogative to direct any and all prosecutions as part of his 
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
219
 Others argue that 
prosecution remains a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative function.
220
 Despite the 
considerable firepower employed, it is a debate that shows no signs of abating. 
This Note does not seek to resolve the debate over the constitutional bounds 
of presidential influence, but rather to ground it in a more realistic assessment 
of the dynamics at play. The discussion above reveals a subtler answer to ques-
tions of executive control. Contrary to the fears raised by those who oppose ex-
ecutive-branch control of criminal law,
221
 a recognition of executive authority in 
theory does not mean that Congress cannot raise its own obstacles in practice. 
The Founders crafted a system in which Congress “stood first among equals” 
precisely because it retains the power to structure the other branches.
222
 From 
appointments to appropriations to office creation, Congress can constrain the 
executive branch in myriad ways. Therefore, Congress itself can facilitate an “in-
ternal separation of powers” by providing a much-needed checking mechanism 
on presidential power within the executive branch itself.
223
 
The history and contemporary dynamics related above therefore highlight 
the difference between executive-branch power and presidential power. The ex-
pansion of the executive branch across the country may limit the scope of the 
President’s (and upper-level cabinet officials’) power. Justice Stevens warned in 
his dissent in Printz v. United States that by limiting the ability of the federal gov-
ernment to enlist state officers, the Court “create[d] incentives for the National 
Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State’s rights, the majority 
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2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/opinion/robert-mueller-tillis-coons-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GV9-RRA8]. 
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223. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from 
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319-22 (2006); see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Re-
lationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 427-34 (2009). 
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would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to imple-
ment its policies.”
224
 But while “vast national bureaucracies” may expand the 
reach of the executive branch, to do so they necessarily reduce the President’s 
ability to monitor these moving pieces. Furthermore, these disparate actors form 
relationships with more proximate state and local officials who influence their 
enforcement decisions. 
The dispersion of power in the criminal domain specifically guards against 
the politicization of law enforcement. Political scientists have long demonstrated 
that centralization and politicization are related and even substitutable strategies 
for an administration trying to maximize presidential power.
225
 Events from Wa-
tergate to the U.S. Attorney firings bear out such predictions in practice and 
demonstrate that when Presidents attempt to exert control over law enforce-
ment, they often do so for explicitly political reasons. Take, for example, the sec-
ond Bush Administration’s attempts to centralize control over criminal law en-
forcement. Main Justice placed U.S. Attorneys on “removal lists” for failing to 
investigate certain Democratic politicians or for failing to meet Department 
guideline statistics for gun and immigration crimes.
226
 The Administration also 
populated Main Justice not with career prosecutors, but with Administration in-
siders.
227
 To quote from the Inspector General Report, “Department leaders ab-
dicated their responsibility to ensure that prosecutorial decisions would be based 
on the law . . . rather than political pressure.”
228
 
The balance between political control and politicization remains a fine one. 
Many express discomfort with a “deep state” bureaucracy openly opposed to ex-
ecutive control, but many others voice fears over precisely this sort of politiciza-
tion of law enforcement.
229
 These moves may frustrate the President’s constitu-
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government decisions were heavily influenced by unelected administrative officials who were 
in danger of gradually marginalizing the “general interest”); B. Guy Peters, Politicization: 
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tional mandate to execute the law.
230
 As some have noted in the immigration law 
context, “[w]ithout control of the bureaucracy, it can be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a modern administration to implement its agenda.”
231
 
This Note suggests that a practical check on executive authority over enforce-
ment in an area devoid of formal legal constraints should be viewed in a positive 
light. As former White House Counsel Bob Bauer has written, when Presidents 
exert control over the DOJ, “[o]ne of the norms most clearly at risk is that which 
serves to safeguard the independence of federal law enforcement.”
232
 The per-
ception of independence remains crucial for the Department’s ability to enjoy 
public confidence and attract talent. Following the U.S. Attorney firings, the per-
ceived loss of independence led to the deterioration of morale and widespread 
resignations throughout the Department.
233
 Popular distaste for presidential in-
fluence over the Department of Justice reflects a norm of agency independence 
with a long heritage of societal approval.
234
 The ways in which Congress frus-
trates presidential influence can thus be seen as a constitutional feature, not a 
bug. 
Commentators often argue that a notable counterweight to presidential 
power can be found in an insulated, independent civil service.
235
 The DOJ, pop-
ulated with presidentially appointed officials vested with a great deal of auton-
omy, might provide an effective middle ground. Its bureaucratic strength gains 
more democratic legitimacy through the combination of presidential appoint-
ment and a level of autonomy that is encouraged and reinforced by congression-
ally imposed mechanisms. 
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B. Dispersion as a Means of Facilitating Local Participation 
The current structure of federal criminal law constrains national, including 
presidential, power in another underappreciated way: it encourages significant 
interactions between federal enforcement officials and state and local forces, in-
tegrating the latter’s preferences into the scheme. In other words, the structure 
perpetuates an internal separation of powers within the agency, whereby line 
prosecutors balance (and often prioritize) the opinions of local stakeholders 
against Main Justice directives. In , local participation promotes federalism val-
ues within the federal administration of justice. Interactions between members 
of Congress and federal law enforcement give prosecutors the political capital to 
resist Main Justice priorities, while the relationships between federal and local 
law enforcement allow for the incorporation of local preferences. 
As the discussion above has revealed, differing priorities between Main Jus-
tice and the USAOs are borne out in highly salient policy areas such as drug 
policy and sentencing. To take another example, federal prosecutors vary a great 
deal in how they charge statutes that criminalize the use of certain firearms, in-
cluding those that criminalize employment of a firearm in relation to a drug traf-
ficking felony or crime of violence.
236
 Again, U.S. Attorneys have justified this 
variation by citing local law enforcement priorities, community concerns, and 
congressional mandates. The Sentencing Commission has concluded that “dif-
ferent regions and prosecutors have varying practices in this regard.”
237
 Local 
law enforcement seeking to enlist a USAO to take on a firearms-trafficking case 
will tailor their “pitch” to the needs of the district. In the words of one agent 
from the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in Wis-
consin, local authorities think about “marketing with the federal prosecutor’s 
office to convince them that smaller straw purchasing cases, like what we get in 
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According to many local police chiefs, because local gun control laws are gen-
erally weak, “their best option for handling serious gun offenders is to work with 
ATF and their U.S. Attorney to obtain federal charges.”
239
 But where local law 
enforcement is more successful in prosecuting gun crimes, federal prosecutors 
have dialed back their efforts. When testifying before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, James Comey, a former U.S. Attorney for Manhattan and Managing As-
sistant U.S. Attorney in Richmond, Virginia, made the following statement: 
As I have explained to people a bunch of times, when I was running the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office in Richmond, Virginia, there was a real need for a 
Federal impact on gun possession crimes. Because people weren’t getting 
the kind of time they needed to reduce violent crime in the State system. 
When I moved to being U.S. attorney in Manhattan, [Manhattan District 
Attorney] Bob Morgenthau and his office were all over gun possession 
crimes, and doing it very aggressively. So my approach changed . . . . 
[J]ust comparing my experience in Manhattan to my experience in Rich-
mond, my gun numbers per capita dropped off dramatically when I be-
came U.S. attorney in Manhattan.
240
 
In other words, a U.S. Attorney “changed his approach” not in response to a 
Main Justice directive, but to local law enforcement. Those who have worked 
within prosecutors’ offices also attest that enforcement variations reflect the dif-
fering priorities of U.S. Attorneys and their proximate local officials. They struc-
ture these priorities based on such factors as “the coordination between state and 
federal law enforcement, a district’s proximity to an international border, pecu-
liarities within different prosecutors’ offices, and whether the population of a 
given area is urban or rural.”
241
 As Sarah Sun Beale has noted, sentencing statis-
tics indicate that each district “has its own character, which reflects not only the 
law enforcement situation in the district, but also the attitudes and practices 
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The variation of enforcement priorities depending on the district in question 
has much to be said in its favor. First, temporarily setting aside normative rea-
sons for internalizing community considerations, federal officials have to take 
into account state preferences for the simple reason that they rely on local law 
enforcement. For instance, local law enforcement provides “a lion’s share of the 
personnel and street-level intelligence necessary in order to implement federal 
drug policies.”
243
 The structure of federal criminal law facilitates the creation of 
relationships that cross jurisdictional boundaries, necessarily allowing local pref-
erences to permeate the system. As outlined above, federal prosecutors interact 
with a variety of state and local law enforcement officials because of their statu-
tory overlap and physical proximity.
244
 
Federal prosecutors must necessarily cooperate with state and local forces 
because they are quite clearly outnumbered. There are almost 5,000 Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys prosecuting criminal cases across the country. Meanwhile, there 
are 500 Assistant District Attorneys in Manhattan alone and approximately 
25,000 nationwide.
245
 And when the time comes to find investigators to bring 
cases, consider the fact that there are 120,000 federal officers scattered across the 
country, but 765,000 full-time state and local officers (36,023 in New York City 
alone).
246
 This strength in numbers, as well as the “effective elimination of the 
boundary between federal and state substantive law,”
247
 means that federal pros-
ecutors could not ignore local enforcement priorities even if they wanted to. 
Sensitivity to local problems therefore begets more effective enforcement. 
Each district has a distinct set of judges, juries, and enforcement officials.
248
 U.S. 
Attorneys and their assistants can use their knowledge of these local factors to 
determine the best enforcement strategy.
249
 Moreover, some USAOs interact 
with seventeen local police departments, some with over 750 police chiefs.
250
 Set-
ting a nationwide policy requiring prosecutions of all drug seizures at a certain 
threshold that could be rationally applied to Miami would entirely eliminate 
prosecution of drug seizures in states ranging from Vermont to Idaho. A thresh-
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old appropriate for Vermont and Idaho, in turn, could not feasibly be applied to 
more highly populated states with more drugs.
251
 
In the words of Vincent Broderick, “[l]ocal variations are important because 
of the wide spectrum of conditions, attitudes and expectations spanning the na-
tion. Overcentralization can produce a rigidity engendering hostility and causing 
diminution of respect for the national government.”
252
 Criminal law specifically 
is uniquely suited for such community-based considerations. Indeed, many ar-
guments offered in the interest of uniformity in the implementation of federal 
programs and initiatives speak more to an interest in top-down control over the 
civil rather than criminal division of the DOJ. Our system of criminal law has 
always been particularly concerned with “community-based considerations.”
253
 
Most criminal activity, particularly violent criminal activity, does not cross over 
state lines.
254
 The respect for crime as a domain of local concern is reflected in 
federal courts’ doctrine on the subject. The Supreme Court often has strained to 
interpret federal statutes such that they do not target purely local conduct.
255
  
The courts of appeals have voiced their approval of such tailoring of enforce-
ment decisions to community norms. For example, they have allowed federal 
judges in sentencing to take into consideration “community-based and geo-
graphic factors.”
256
 The Second Circuit sitting en banc has held that a federal 
judge can issue an upward deviation from the Sentencing Guidelines to reflect 
the need to more severely punish gun trafficking in New York City.
257
 The First 
Circuit has agreed with that reasoning, holding that a judge in sentencing can 
take into account the prevalence of violent crime in the district.
258
 “Community-
based considerations are inextricably intertwined with deterrence,” the Court 
explained, “which aims to ‘prevent[ ] criminal behavior by the population at 
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While jurists and scholars have long associated federalism with the values of 
experimentation and variation, they are only beginning to explore the wide de-
gree of variance within federal implementation schemes.
260
 Federal criminal en-
forcement evinces a remarkable degree of variation within a national enforce-
ment regime. It therefore provides one example of the ways in which, as Abbe 
Gluck has written, “[t]he modern federal regulatory apparatus is increasingly 
attendant to questions of the state-federal allocation of responsibility, and also is 
dependent on state actors, in ways both practical and political.”
261
 
In the context of federal criminal law, federalism and separation of powers 
serve to reinforce one another,
262
 but the organization of federal criminal law 
adds another dimension to the analysis, as federal agents physically dispersed 
across the country remain subject to local influence. U.S. Attorneys often speak 
of the importance of forming “strong partnerships with . . . local law enforce-
ment partners.”
263
 The dispersed federal bureaucracy therefore turns locals into 
the law enforcement “partners” of federal officials, rather than relegating them 
to the role of “servant” that they often play in the federalism literature.
264
 And a 
partner quite clearly has more voice than a servant. 
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C. The Perils of Decentralization 
It is possible, of course, that the federal government has an obligation to pur-
sue the same law enforcement goals everywhere. The emphasis on prosecution 
of different crimes in different districts could threaten the principle of equal jus-
tice before the law and produce seemingly arbitrary enforcement patterns. It 
might seem categorically unfair for a person who committed a particular crime 
to be subject to a starkly different punishment than a similarly situated person 
in a different district. As Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have written, “[i]f 
we think that low-level marijuana possession by a person with no other criminal 
record should not be punished, then we should hope that judgment applies to 
all cases, not to a random subset of violators.”
265
 
Yet perhaps more important from the perspective of those seeking criminal-
justice reform, the rare prior attempts at more fully centralizing criminal enforce-
ment have been an unmitigated disaster, resulting in more draconian penalties 
for criminal defendants. Presidential attempts at centralization are often deeply 
politicized, tainting public perceptions of the entire apparatus.
266
 Congressional 
forays into centralization have proven no better. The most prominent example is 
provided by the congressional creation of the Sentencing Commission to the 
Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines were politically and legally problematic 
from the beginning. The Supreme Court ultimately struck down the mandatory 
provisions, which had resulted in the creation of a remarkably severe set of pen-
alties for criminal offenses.
267
 This should not be taken to suggest that we cannot 
pursue means by which to oversee and regulate prosecutorial conduct, but rather 
that the above analysis points us in more viable and productive directions. 
Indeed, even as this Note promotes the general structure of our federal ad-
ministration of justice, we should not view this system through rose-colored 
glasses. There are undeniable costs to the status quo. Congress has not permitted 
complete executive centralization, but neither has it taken complete responsibil-
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ity for the criminal apparatus itself.
268
 The decentralized nature of the criminal 
law regime necessarily leads to a lack of transparency within the justice system, 
granting individual prosecutors a level of power perhaps unparalleled across fed-
eral enforcement systems. 
Problems inherent in the abundance of broad criminal statutes, enabling an 
enormous amount of prosecutorial discretion (when wielded by any member of 
the executive branch) and a resulting lack of transparency, have been well docu-
mented. Over ninety-seven percent of federal criminal convictions are achieved 
by a guilty plea.
269
 Plea bargaining—which occurs in secret backrooms and over 
private telephone conversations rather than public courtrooms—“reduce[s]  
juries’ roles and . . . hide[s] cases from public scrutiny.”
270
 Prosecution by guilty 
plea becomes a “low-visibility process about which the public has poor infor-
mation and little right to participate.”
271
 Prosecutors rarely justify their decisions 
to bring charges and almost never explain a decision not to enforce a law in a 
particular case. As former Assistant Attorney General Phillip Heymann once said 
in a public hearing, “we can’t talk very much about our declinations . . . [s]o the 




Proposals to date aimed at reining in prosecutorial discretion and increasing 
transparency, however, fail to acknowledge the dynamics at play. Arguments for 
legislation to abolish plea bargaining or to revise broadly written criminal stat-
utes may be attractive in theory, but have little chance of success in practice.
273
 
And while ex ante regulation by distant and relatively inactive legislatures is ei-
ther inadvisable or unobtainable, ex post supervision by judges has been cate-
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gorically rejected by that branch. The judiciary has completely shielded discre-
tionary decisions of prosecutors from legal review.
274
 
Institutional design may provide a more promising avenue than legal regu-
lation. As many political scientists have observed, it is far easier for Congress to 
pass institutional-design reforms than substantive policy changes because de-
sign reforms cut across interest groups and their effects on constituencies are 
harder to assess.
275
 But most scholarship on institutional design focuses on ad-
ministrative agencies, segregating them from criminal law enforcement.
276
 The 
story of federal criminal law, however, reveals that members of Congress have 
consistently opted for institutional-design reforms over policy change in this 
area. 
Given that members of Congress prefer delegation at the U.S. Attorney level, 
it is possible that centralization and transparency initiatives can best be achieved 
within each USAO. Reforms in this area would have the added benefit of tailor-
ing local-federal enforcement priorities to the realities on the ground. Height-
ened authority for U.S. Attorneys to institutionalize their enforcement authority, 
via the congressionally mandated publication of office enforcement priorities, or 
the creation of a district-specific U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, might supply an effec-
tive middle ground. 
A more open chronicling of priorities and the choices made by each district 
would allow for clearer, more comprehensive, and more meaningful oversight. 
As newly appointed federal Judge Stephanos Bibas has documented, “[t]he pub-
lic calls for raising sentences because it systematically underestimates average 
penalties; if it understood penalties better, it would think them high enough.”
277
 
But the public (or their representatives) cannot understand and influence en-
forcement priorities if the information is unavailable to them. Further, although 
there are good reasons to promote variation across USAOs, those benefits are 
extinguished within any individual office. A more public and internally enforce-
able set of policies would go a long way toward ensuring office-wide consistency. 
The goal of transparency can also be served by promoting the interbranch 
rivalry documented above. It is precisely through clashes between Main Justice 
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and the USAOs—from the battle over marijuana enforcement and sentencing to 
the controversy over the U.S. Attorney firings—that important policy decisions 
in the criminal arena are brought to public attention. While this Note has argued 
in favor of maintaining our current equilibrium, it does not argue that either 
entity should remain inactive. In this way, transparency is further served by the 
process of ambition counteracting ambition both within and without the execu-
tive branch. 
D. Implications 
In recent years, the Madisonian vision of legislative/executive separation of 




 Many have 
highlighted how Congress has abandoned responsibility in a variety of areas 
from immigration to foreign policy to administrative law.
280
 Pildes and Levinson 
have made the most forceful and persuasive case that Congress has essentially 
ceased to play its role in the constitutional plan. They note that the Madisonian 
“vision of competitive branches balancing and checking one another has domi-
nated constitutional thought,” but remains hopelessly outdated.
281
 Most fatally, 
Madison “never provided a mechanism by which the interests of actual public 




This Note contradicts the pessimists and argues that all hope is not lost. 
Madison himself conceded that it was “not possible to give to each department 
an equal power of self-defense.”
283
 In many domains, the Executive enjoys the 
practical power of the initiative and the constitutional power of ultimate control. 
Criminal law is one such area. But the above study reveals a more competitive 
interplay than previously acknowledged. Individual interests of members of 
Congress can diverge from party interests, motivating a desire for personal con-
trol that directly opposes presidential power. Some have commented that Presi-
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(“[C]ongressional abdication of legislative power to the executive is at least as much of a 
problem as congressional self-aggrandizement.”). 
281. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 20, at 2317. 
282. Id. 
283. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 19, at 322. 
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dents have to broker differences within their own party to pass legislation,
284
 but 
there are also policy domains that are more or less susceptible to interbranch 
contests. By disaggregating the contexts that are more susceptible to interbranch 
rivalry, we can promote competition and adapt legal regimes to compensate for 
those areas that are decidedly not. 
This argument suggests some limitations to the Levinson and Pildes theory 
as well as some possible mechanisms by which we might fill in the gaps Madison 
left for us. Levinson and Pildes themselves concede in passing that there is a pos-
sibility for branch affiliation where political interests do not track party affilia-
tion, such as pork spending (e.g., highway bills).
285
 The history of the DOJ re-
veals a sustained interbranch rivalry over a huge variety of salient criminal-
enforcement issues rather than a discrete appropriations project. The struggle 
also indicates that the power granted to Congress to structure the executive 
branch provides a counterweight to complete presidential control. By structur-
ing federal law enforcement such that the locus of authority remains largely 
within each USAO, Congress has thus far effectively stymied Main Justice efforts 
to exercise complete control over the apparatus. 
Furthermore, Congress has confronted the Executive most forcefully when 
presidential priorities have conflicted with local initiatives. In other words, the 
answer to the puzzle posed by Madison in Federalist 51 about how ambition can 
be made to “counteract ambition”
286
 might be found in another of his papers: 
The Federalist No. 10. There, Madison outlined the value of another prized theor-
y: federal decentralization.
287
 Madison explained that a notable benefit of Amer-
ica’s geographic expanse was the inevitability of conflicting place-based fac-
tions.
288
 Dispersing power geographically carried numerous benefits, among 
them that “local situation[s]” would produce geographical ideological varia-
tion.
289
 With regard to federal criminal law, dispersion and decentralization have 
borne out that vision. Prosecutors scattered across the country vary enforcement 
policies based on the preferences and demands of their districts, and they pro-
vide a notable counterweight to D.C. dominance. 
 
284. See Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist Response to Levin-
son and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 213 (2006). 
285. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 20, at 2324. 
286. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 19, at 322. 
287. See David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L. REV. 727, 737-38 (2018). 
288. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 19, at 83 (James Madison). 
289. Id. at 81-83. 
separation of prosecutors 
1129 
conclusion 
While scholars remain unable to let the prosecutorial power debate “rest in 
peace,”
290
 they have reached a consensus that congressional power is stuck per-
manently six feet under. Yet Congress has promoted the decentralized structure 
of the Department of Justice against the wishes of the Executive since the Found-
ing. Even in the face of more sustained centralization efforts in the modern era, 
the USAOs continue to operate with a remarkable amount of autonomy. Regard-
less of what one hopes for the future of federal criminal law, with a variety of 
enforcement agencies at the President’s and Congress’s disposal, we would do 
well to learn from the benefits and drawbacks of the structure of the contempo-
rary DOJ.  
This Note has argued that the dispersed nature of federal criminal law has 
several advantages. First, this structure places a practical check on presidential 
control, which facilitates the depoliticization of the apparatus. Second, it allows 
for variation within the national enforcement scheme, permitting stakeholders 
at the state and local levels to play a significant role as they influence their more 
proximate federal counterparts. At the same time, the Executive has its own role 
to play in maintaining the interbranch struggle. Not only are some areas of the 
enforcement process more amenable to centralization, but the process of inter-
branch conflict yields benefits in its own right, bringing controversial enforce-
ment policies into public view. Rather than giving up on the rivalry between the 
branches, then, this Note hopes to promote a focus on the branches’ “relation-
ships and interconnections, on maintaining the conditions in which the intended 
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